Perestroika Deception (2nd Oct. Revolution)

The world’s slide towards


Anatoliy Golitsyn

Author of ‘New Lies For Old’

Who is Anatoly Golitsyn?


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Anatoliy Golitsyn was born in the Ukraine in 1926.  While a cadet in military school, he was awarded a Soviet medal ‘For the defence of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War’ for digging anti-tank trenches near Moscow.  At the age of fifteen, he joined the Komsomol (League of Communist Youth) and, at nineteen, he became a member of the Communist Party.

In the same year, he joined the KGB, in which he studied and served until 1961.  He graduated from the Moscow School of Military Counter-espionage, the counterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School, and the University of Marxism-Leninism and completed a correspondence course with the High Diplomatic School.  In 1952 and early 1953 he was involved with a friend in drawing up a proposal to the Central Committee on the reorganisation of Soviet intelligence.

In connection with this proposal he attended a meeting of the secretariat chaired by Stalin and a meeting of the Presidium chaired by Malenkov and attended by Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Bulganin.  In 1952-53 he worked briefly as head of a section responsible for counter-espionage against the United States.  In 1959 he graduated with a law degree from a four-year course at the KGB Institute (now the KGB Academy) in Moscow.

From 1959 to 1960, at a time when Soviet long-range strategy was being formulated and the KGB was being reorganised to play its part in it, he served as a senior analyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intelligence service.  He served in Vienna and Helsinki on counterintelligence assignments from 1953 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1961, respectively.

He defected to the United States in December 1961.  Subsequently, his contribution to the national security of leading Western countries was recognised by the award of the United States Government Medal for Distinguished Service.

He was made an Honorary Commander of the British Empire (CBE).  A promise of membership of the Legion d’Honneur  made when President Pompidou was in power was not fulfilled owing to the change of government.

Since 1962, the Author has spent much of his time on the study of Communist and international affairs, reading both the Communist and the Western press.  In 1980 he completed, and in 1984 he published, ‘New Lies for Old’, a study of the Soviet long-range strategy of deception and disinformation.


For over thirty years, the Author has submitted Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency, in which he has provided the Agency with timely and largely accurate forecasts of Soviet Bloc developments and on the evolution of Soviet/Russian/Communist strategy.  By applying the dialectical methodology which drives the strategy, the Author has been able to score innumerable “bulls-eyes”.  This unparalleled track record reflects the Author’s personal experience of four years in the KGB’s strategy ‘think tank’, together with his deep understanding of the dialectical nature of the strategy and the Leninist mentality of its originators and implementers.

The Author is a citizen of the United States.




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Yakovlev as Head of the Foreign Policy Commission  22


Despite adverse circumstances, I have made a consistent attempt to analyse important developments in the USSR and other Communist countries through the prism of Communist long-range strategy, strategic disinformation and the political role of the KGB.  I continued to submit my Memoranda to the CIA about significant Communist developments and made suggestions on how to improve the Agency’s understanding of Communist strategy.

It is axiomatic that political ideas should be tested out in practice.  And it is a fact that many of my predictions, particularly about the coming economic and political reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe, passed the test and were confirmed by subsequent events, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Since then, I have submitted new Memoranda to the CIA and American policymakers in which I explained Soviet grand strategy and its strategic designs against the West, the essence of ‘perestroika’ (the final phase of the strategy), the new use of


the Bloc’s political and security potential for introducing new deceptive controlled ‘democratic’, ‘nationalist’ and ‘non-Communist’ structures in the Communist countries, and the deployment of the political and security potential of the renewed ‘democratic’ regimes for the execution of the strategic design against the West.

In the Memoranda, I provided seven keys for understanding ‘perestroika’, explained the danger of Western support for it and proposed a reassessment of the situation and a re-thinking of that support as priority items of business.  I suggested also how the West should respond to the challenge of ‘perestroika’ and its destabilising effect on the Western democracies.

Since the Central Intelligence Agency did not react to my Memoranda, I decided to publish them and asked the CIA to declassify them for the purpose.  The Agency agreed.  Several considerations forced me to take my decision.

First, the democracies of the United States and Western Europe are facing a dangerous situation and are vulnerable because their governments, the Vatican, the elite, the media, the industrialists, the financiers, the trade unions and, most important, the general public are blind to the dangers of the strategy of ‘perestroika’ and have failed to perceive the deployment of the Communist political potential of the renewed ‘democratic’ regimes against the West.  The democracies could perish unless they are informed about the aggressive design of’perestroika’ against them.

Secondly, I could not imagine that American policymakers, and particularly the conservatives in both the Republican and Democratic parties, despite their long experience with Communist treachery, would not be able to grasp the new manoeuvres of the Communist strategists and would rush to commit the West to helping ‘perestroika’ which is so contrary to their interests.

It has been sad to observe the jubilation of American and West European conservatives who have been cheering ‘perestroika’ without realising that it is intended to bring about their own political and physical demise.  Liberal support for ‘perestroika’ is understandable, but conservative support came as a surprise to me.

Thirdly, I was appalled that ‘perestroika’ was embraced and supported by the United States without any serious debate on the subject.

In the fourth place, I am appalled by the failure of American scholars to point out the relevance of Lenin’s New Economic Policy to understanding the aggressive, anti-Western design of ‘perestroika’ or to provide appropriate warning to policymakers, and their failure to distinguish between America’s true friends and its Leninist foes precisely because these foes are wearing the new ‘democratic’ uniform.  Given the pressures they face, policymakers have no time to study the history of the period of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, or to remind themselves of Marxist-Leninist dialectics.

But how could such learned and distinguished scholars as S. Bialer and Z. Brzezinski have failed to warn them about the successes of the New Economic Policy, the mistakes made by the West in accepting it and Gorbachev’s repetition of Lenin’s strategy and its dangers for the West?  What happened to their credentials as great scholars?  Why was it left to Professor Norman Stone of Oxford University to detect and make the parallel in his article in the London ‘Daily Telegraph’ of 11th November 1989, and to express concern at the euphoria over Gorbachev?  In his book, The Grand Failure, Brzezinski limited his description of Lenin’s New Econ-

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omic Policy to three brief phrases.  He described the New Economic Policy as amounting to a reliance on the market mechanism and private initiative to stimulate economic recovery.  In his words, it was probably ‘the most open and intellectually innovative phase’ in Soviet history.

For Brzezinski, the NEP is ‘a shorthand term for a period of experimentation, flexibility and moderation’ [see The Grand Failure, Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1989, pages 18-19].  I am appalled by Brzezinski’s failure to explain the relevance of Lenin’s New Economic Policy to ‘perestroika’.

This failure is further illustrated by the following:

(a)  S. Bialer, a former defector from the Central Committee apparatus of the Polish Communist Party, wrote a foreword to Gorbachev’s book, ‘Perestroika’, introducing it to the US public without inserting any warning about the parallel with the New Economic Policy and its dangers for the Western democracies.

(b)  During his recent visit to Moscow, Z. Brzezinski, the former National Security Adviser in the Carter Administration, met leading Soviet strategists including Yakovlev, an expert on the manipulation of the Western media, and advised them on how to proceed with ‘perestroika’.  Furthermore, Brzezinski delivered a lecture on the same subject to the Soviet diplomats at the High Diplomatic Academy!

In the fifth place, I am disappointed that Gordievsky, a recent KGB defector, did not help much to explain ‘perestroika’ as the final phase of Soviet long-range strategy, to describe its essence or to point out the deceptive nature of the changes and the strategic danger for the West.  Gordievsky’s articles in The Times of London  of 27-28 February and 1 March 1990, contained a rather optimistic, if not laudatory, description of the ‘reforms’ initiated under Gorbachev and Yakovlev.  I am puzzled that he should write so enthusiastically about them in the London Times.  He might as well have published his comments in the Party newspaper ‘Pravda’ or in Korotich’s ‘Ogonek’.  His assessment of ‘perestroika’ and its meaning for the West is in complete contradiction to that set out in my Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency.  Further comment would be superfluous.  I leave it to the reader to make his own judgment.

In the sixth place, misguided Western support for ‘perestroika’ at all levels, and especially among the Western media, is destabilising Western societies, their defence, their political processes and their alliances.  It is immensely accelerating the successful execution of the Soviet strategic design against the West.  In 1984 I thought that, in the event of Western resistance to Soviet strategy, the scenario of convergence between the two systems might take the next half century to unroll [see “New Lies for Old’, pages 365-6].

Now, however, because the West has committed itself to the support of ‘perestroika’ and because of the impact of the misguided and euphoric support for it in the Western media, convergence might take less than a decade.  The sword of Damocles is hanging over the Western democracies, yet they are oblivious to it.  I believe in truth and the power of ideas to convey the truth.

Therefore, I present my Memoranda to the public — convinced that they will help them to see the ‘perestroika’ changes, and their sequels, in the Communist world and beyond, in a more realistic light, and to recover from their blindness.

[Signed:]  Anatoliy Golitsyn, United States, 1995


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March 1989

Soviet Research and Preparation for the Strategy

Under the guidance of the Party apparatus, special research studies were initiated and carried out from September 1957 onwards by the Soviet Academy of Sciences in preparation for the strategy.  The Party apparatus and its ‘think-tanks’ — the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences — employed the results of this research in seeking scientific and theoretical solutions to the primary domestic problems associated with the strategy.  It was these ‘think-tanks’ which developed the scenarios for Soviet reforms and trained Soviet and Bloc Party leaders, such as Dubcek, in the spirit and demands of the strategy.

The KGB Institute and its Research Department conducted a number of special studies for the Central Committee.  Among them were studies on ‘new methods of neutralising political opposition in the USSR’, and ‘disclosure of state secrets in the interest of strategy’ which has an obvious connection with the present ‘openness’ or ‘glasnost’ — one feature of which is the disclosure of quantities of accurate information together with disinformation.

Special studies of the economies and international relations of the leading capitalist countries were conducted by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.  The Institute paid close attention to the European Common Market and to clashes of economic interest between the United States, Western Europe and Japan.  The appointment of the Director of this Institute as a chief economic adviser to Gorbachev can be explained by the contribution made by the Institute to the strategy.

A special research organ, the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, was set up in 1960 in Moscow to meet the demands of the strategy.  For almost the whole period of the strategy, the Institute, led by Academician Georgiy Arbatov, has studied in depth every major political, social, cultural and racial problem in the United States.  The Institute keeps a close watch on the workings of the Executive, Congress, the press, political parties and the more important religious organisations.

Arbatov and his subordinates have established close relations with the American elite, cultivating many leading politicians, scientists, religious leaders, experts in Soviet affairs, journalists and cultural figures through meetings in Washington and invitations to visit the Soviet Union.

Soviet-American student exchanges have been used to study the workings of American institutions and to train Soviet experts in areas which have a bearing on the execution of the strategy.  For instance, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev’s key adviser on international policy and the promotion of ‘perestroika’ in the American media, studied the media at Columbia University on an exchange programme.

The Soviet Embassy in Washington has played a special role in studying the inner workings of American policy formulation and providing advice to Soviet strategists.  A significant novelty was introduced into the work of the Soviet ambassador to the United States.  In the interests of the strategy, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin was made Chief KGB Rezident in Washington in order that the diplomatic work of the Embassy could be fully coordinated with the exploitation of the assets of the KGB Rezidentura, especially its important agents of influence among politicians, businessmen, scientists and Western journalists.

The Author prepared a special Memorandum on Anatoliy Dobrynin for the

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CIA which confirmed Dobrynin’s use of KGB agents along strategic lines.  The late Mr James Angleton concluded that the Memorandum should be published in declassified form in order to neutralise Dobrynin’s political influence in Washington and have him expelled for interference in the internal affairs of the United States.  The findings of the Memorandum were, however, disregarded after the Watergate hearings which destabilised the American intelligence and counter-intelligence services.


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Yakovlev as Head of the Foreign Policy Commission

According to the new method, Yakovlev was chosen to be head of the Foreign Policy Commission because of his expertise on the Western and especially the American media acquired during his studies at Columbia University and during a recent tour as Ambassador to Canada.  His selection shows that the Soviet strategists realise that Western acceptance of and support for ‘perestroika’ depend to a large extent on the Western media.  Yakovlev’s main task is to present, project and sell ‘perestroika’ to the West as a novel, pragmatic, opportunistic, non-ideological policy which harbours no aggressive, strategic design against the West [see Note 9 page 22].

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9 Author’s Note | see page 21):  Yakovlev was chosen as Gorbachev’s adviser on the media during the Communist phase ot ‘perestroika’.  His subsequent re-emergence as head of the national television network and in fact Yeltsin’s adviser on the media during the ‘democratic’ phase of ‘perestroika’ illustrates the continuity of the strategy.

[ … … ]

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The Soviet campaign to engage the American elite

The new method detects an active Soviet offensive to reach the American elite and to engage it in close cooperation and ‘restructuring’ in the United States.  This operation is evident, inter alia, from the following developments:

1.  The meeting between Gorbachev, his chief American experts (Dobrynin, Ambassador Dubinin, Yakovlev, Arbatov, Pozner10 and others) and selected members of the American elite present at the Soviet Embassy, during Gorbachev’s first visit to Washington.

[ … … ]

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The Soviet Campaign against anti-Communists in the West

The Soviets, their allies and KGB agents of influence will conduct a campaign of political and ideological warfare against anti-Communism and the political influence of anti-Communists in the West.  It will project Soviet ‘perestroika’ as a fundamental change in the Soviet system, as a dissolution of Communist ideology, as a reduction in the Soviet threat and as an end of the Cold War.

Georgiy Arbatov described the process as the ‘removal of the Soviet enemy from the minds of the Americans’16.  The Soviet media, the Soviets’ allies and agents of influence will attack and seek to isolate anti-Communism and anti-Communists as obstacles to ‘restructuring’, ‘cold warriors’ and enemies of peace.

The targets of the assault will be the political leaders and government officials who have a realistic understanding of the Soviet threat; anti-Communists in the Republican and Democratic parties, especially those on the political and religious right; anti-Communists in the socialist, social democratic and conservative parties in Western Europe; American and European experts on Soviet affairs and members of the American and European media who are trying to be objective in presenting ‘perestroika’ and its meaning for the democracies.

They will be attacked as reactionaries, bureaucrats with outworn ideas, political or religious Cold War warriors, spoilers or just fascists.  The attack will aim to neutralise them by ridicule and to turn them into an endangered species.

An article in The New York Times of 19 September 1988 by Stephen Cohen, an American expert on Soviet affairs and ‘perestroika’ in particular, gives one an idea of what may be expected.  Mr. Cohen writes that the centrists lack the guts to respond to Gorbachev.  For this reason, he gives the new President disturbing advice, ‘to appoint to all relevant foreign policy positions only people deeply committed to the anti-Cold War effort’.  The Soviet Yakovlevs and Arbatovs can be expected to accelerate the neutralisation and removal from Western political life of anti-Communists through new, calculated projections of Soviet and East European developments.

[ … … ]

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Gorbachev’s US visit a Trojan Horse to engage the American

The visit of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the United States, like those of Khrushchev and Brezhnev before him, is a good illustration of Soviet strategic duplicity and American naivete.  The President, the Administration and US counterintelligence all failed to comprehend that the main purpose of the visit was not to sign a treaty but to introduce the Americans to the strategy of restructuring Soviet and American societies towards convergence, and to engage the American elite in the acceptance and promotion of this concept.

Prior to the visit, the Soviet offensive had met with scant success:  only a few leaders had been impressed — notably the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher who set a precedent by seeing in Gorbachev a man with whom she could ‘do business’.

Earlier meetings of representatives of the American elite with Gorbachev and Sakharov in Moscow had left the Americans sceptical of the sincerity and depth of Gorbachev and his reforms.  Now, with Gorbachev’s visit, the Soviets have stepped up their campaign to influence the American elite — exploiting its fear of nuclear war, its confusion over the true ‘convergence’ meaning inherent in ‘perestroika’ and its naive euphoria over the signing of a treaty.

It is for this reason that the Soviets sent over their top advisers specialising in strategy, diplomacy (Dobrynin), propaganda and public relations (Yakovlev and Arbatov), science (Velikhov) and a group of economic advisers.  They also sent their leading experts on the American and European media (Pozner and Falin, also an expert on Germany) and controllers of agents of influence like Bessmertnykh 26.  It is for this reason that they arranged gatherings at the Soviet Embassy for leading American politicians, businessmen, publishers, academics, cultural figures and so forth, for briefings and discussions with Gorbachev and Soviet strategists.
26  See text of Note 26 opposite.

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These events, not the treaty signing, were the main events. Their purpose was to influence the American Elite and to seek its cooperation in restructuring Soviet and American thinking and society in accordance with Soviet strategy. According to The New York Times’, Gorbachev addressed American intellectuals as the ‘yeast of events’.

The Soviet operation was apparently successful. It was not exposed, challenged or counteracted. It appears that its strategic political significance went unnoticed even though it took place under the noses of the President, the Administration and US counter-intelligence.

The gatherings were not fully covered by the media. For example, meetings with executives of leading American newspapers, television networks, news magazines and publishing houses were not televised.
The Cable News Network [CNN] showed only a few minutes of one meeting and explained that transmissions from the Soviet Embassy were cut off before guests had had a chance to question Gorbachev. According to CNN, once Gorbachev had finished his address to US legislators, the Soviet television camera was deflected to show a curtain. CNN therefore terminated their broadcast. Typical Soviet ploys like this, despite so-called ‘glasnost’, only lend credence to this assessment.

The need for counteraction by the United States

Because Soviet strategy breeds confusion and is aimed at the peaceful conquest of the United States from within, it is detrimental to American interests and to American security and must be counteracted.  President Reagan’s earlier rhetoric about the ‘Evil Empire’, though it took no account of current Soviet strategy, was healthy and effective in that it prevented the Soviets from entering the United States with their political offensive.  The United States’ sudden switch from confrontation to acceptance of Gorbachev’s ‘process’, and ignorance of the strategy behind it, will divide the American nation.  In Sun Tzu’s terms, the pinnacle of strategy is to be invited into the fortress of the enemy.  Khrushchev used disinformation about Sino-Soviet differences to gain his invitation to visit the United States.  Brezhnev and Deng used disinformation about Sino-Soviet hostilities to gain their invitations.

Gorbachev, in turn, has used disinformation about Soviet democratisation to obtain his invitation.  President Reagan’s embrace of Gorbachev’s initiatives as positive developments has provided the Soviets and the KGB with an opportunity for
26 [page 60] Editor’s Note:  In 1991, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, serving as Soviet Foreign Minister following the resignation in December 1990 of Shevardnadze, commented on the dense network of new bilateral and multilateral accords Moscow was negotiating and signing with countries in both Eastern and Western Europe.  He said that ‘the groundwork has been laid for joint action in every sphere, including political, economic and security areas…’.  Concerning the network of new Soviet bilateral treaties with the East European countries, Bessmertnykh said that they represented an ‘effort by the USSR to update the legal basis of relations with East European countries.  From multilateral agreements [applied] within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union is proceeding to mostly bilateral accords and contacts’.  It should be noted that Golitsyn predicted this regional bilateral ‘treaty offensive’ in Central and Eastern Europe on page 265 of ‘New Lies for Old’.  Specifically, the Author anticipated ‘the development of an effective political, economic, diplomatic, and military substructure under which the Communists can continue to coordinate their policies and actions on a bilateral basis through a system of friendship treaties.  This substructure would not be affected by the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact’.  For the elimination of doubt, the Author has emphasised to the Editor that this prediction ‘refers to friendship treaties with the Bloc countries’.

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active interference in American politics.  It gives them the chance to activate and use for their strategic purposes the friends and agents of influence they have acquired within the American elite over the past twenty-five years.  During the confrontational period, these agents were afraid to act because of the danger of exposure.


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The West has failed to understand another aspect of the introduction of false, controlled ‘democratic’ and ‘non-Communist’ structures in the USSR and Eastern Europe which the Communists have succeeded in concealing.  This is that the basis of these structures rests on ideas expressed by Lenin and his able Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chichcrin, during the NEP period.

One key to understanding this basis lies in Lenin’s advice to Communist Parties ‘to study, to search for, to find and to grasp the one particular powerful, specifically national tactic which will solve our international task … until the final victory of Communism’.  All parties, advised Lenin, must rid themselves of the radical phraseology of the Left Wing.  They must be ready to use a variety of tactics, old and new, legal and illegal.  ‘International Communism’, he went on, ‘must subordinate to itself not only new, but old forms too — not simply to reconcile the new with the old, but to forge all forms, new and old, into a single weapon which will bring full, complete and decisive victory for Communism’.  Following Lenin’s advice, the Soviet strategists and Arbatov’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada have studied Western democracy, its political processes and its media.

It is particularly revealing that Aleksandr Yakovlev, a leading strategist of ‘perestroika’, Yevgeniy Primakov, another leading strategist, Tatyana Zaslavskaya [see page 26], an economist and public opinion institute director, and Nikolay Shmelev, a leading economist behind ‘perestroika’, all studied in the United States.  Drawing on Lenin’s advice, these strategists have borrowed the forms of Western democracy, filled them with new Communist content and introduced them in the USSR and Eastern Europe as means for laying down the basis for convergence and as powerful new weapons to bring about the world victory of Communism.

It is also likely that prominent agents of influence in the West with knowledge of American conditions will have suggested that, to conquer the United States, Communism would have to be Americanised and dressed in ‘democratic’ garb.  The introduction of deceptive ‘democratic’ forms in the Communist world is a further instance of the use for the purposes of strategy of the Bloc’s political and security potential, and particularly of controlled ‘political opposition’.

Another key to understanding these ‘democratic’ forms is the well known advice given by Chicherin to Lenin.  On 20 January 1922, shortly before the Genoa Conference, Chicherin wrote to Lenin:

‘In case the Americans insist on representative institutions, don’t you think that, for solid compensation, we can deceive them by making a small ideological concession which would not have any practical meaning?  For example, we can allow the presence of three representatives of the non-working class in the body of 2,000 members.  Such a step can be presented to the Americans as a representative institution’ [Questions of History of the CPSU, Number 4, 1962, page 152].

Because of the crisis in Soviet Russia at the time and the narrow political base of the regime, Lenin rejected Chicherin’s rather modest deception proposal.  But the idea has been taken up on a massive scale by Lenin’s successors.

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In Fukuyama’s opinion, the Soviet Union has a choice ‘to start down the path that was staked out by Western Europe forty-five years ago, a path that most of Asia followed, or to realise its own uniqueness and remain stuck in history’ as a nationalistic, Slavophile and possibly even fascist state. Fukuyama concludes that ‘the passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance’ and will undermine its ‘pretensions to being in the vanguard of human history’.

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The death of this ideology ‘means the growing “Common Marketisation” of international relations and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflicts between states’.  He feels nostalgia for the time when history existed with its ideological struggle calling forth ‘daring, courage and imagination’, and deplores the prospect of’centuries of boredom’.

Clearly, Fukuyama has misread the true nature of the changes in the Communist countries.  More importantly, he has totally ignored Communist grand strategy and its anti-Western angle.  This makes his analysis superficial and his ‘dialectics’ absurd.  Lenin himself was a great dialectician.  He valued skill in dialectics most highly among the qualities of other Communist leaders.

In his ‘testament’, he expressed concern that the ‘Party’s darling’, Nikolay Nikolay Bukharin, had not fully mastered the use of dialectics.

Fukuyama has no inside knowledge of the real ‘new political thinking’ of the Soviet elite.  This thinking is not the result of contact with the ‘European civilisation around them’; it is the product of their own creative development of Lenin’s dialectics and strategy.  Current Soviet strategists like Yakovlev are skilful dialecticians who are creatively developing and applying Leninist ideas derived from the period of the New Economic Policy.

As indicated earlier, the present grand strategy, adopted in 1958-60, is based upon a classic realisation of the Hegelian dialectical triad:

Thesis:  Stalinism [or Stalinist Communism].
Antithesis:  Rejection of Stalinist Communism
Synthesis:  Converging, merging and marriage of Communist (socialist) substance (content) with democratic format, or ‘democratism’ [= ‘convergence’].

This use of ‘democratic’ form is deceptive:  it is the essence of the strategic manoeuvre which is intended to secure the final world victory of Communism.  Here, in addition to Hegelian dialectics, the Communist strategists took Sun Tzu’s advice.

Sun Tzu wrote:  ‘I base my plans for victory on form, but this is not understood by the common man.  Although each has the ability to behold things as they appear, none understands how I have forged victory’.

Sun Tzu, not Fukuyama, provides the key to understanding the use of ‘democratic, non-Communist, nationalist’ forms by the Communist strategists in their ‘perestroika’.  Fukuyama detects no echoes, in Shevardnadze’s statement, of the classic Stalinist deception which pulled the wool over the eyes of Roosevelt and Churchill in 1943-44.  Fukuyama is misinformed about the ideological dedication of the Soviet elite.  The elite consists basically of Communist Party and Komsomol members and intellectuals who are fulfilling Party and KGB political assignments.

The fact that the Soviet elite has been actively involved in many years of preparation for ‘perestroika’ and is playing an active part in it now, means that its members remain firmly dedicated believers in the Communist cause.

The Soviet strategists and their elite remain persuaded that the contradictions between capital and labour are not fully resolved in the West.  They still view the United States and Western Europe as class societies.

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Gorbachev and his strategists are not true democrats and never will be.  They remain committed to socialism and Communism.  They are a new generation of revolutionaries who are using ‘democratic’ reform as a new way to achieve final victory.  The Communist strategists appreciated that they could not implement their strategy of convergence using the old, obsolete, Stalinist, Communist Party structure and dormant institutions like the old Soviet parliament.  But they do believe that they can carry it out using new, revitalised, ‘democratic’ structures.

They are therefore reorganising the Party system, the Presidency and the legislature to give them more power and prestige and at the same time greater likeness to their American equivalents.  Meanwhile, the Communist Party is apparently relegated to the shadows.  The Communist Party, however, has not surrendered its real monopoly of power.  In fact, it has broadened it by giving power to its members in the Presidency and Congress to execute the strategy of ‘perestroika’ and convergence.  Greater Presidential powers are needed to carry out the strategy throughout the world.  This is not a transfer of power from the Party to the President.  The President remains a member and an instrument of the Party, the executor of its strategy.

He is not the Pope or Luther.  He does not impose his will on the Party; he is fulfilling the Party’s will.  The ultimate decision-making power rests with the Politburo, the Party apparatus and their strategists.  Although the end of the Party’s monopoly is proclaimed, the Party apparatus remains in being and is still being run by the same old-timers.  For example, Yakovlev, who is now a leading strategist of the ‘perestroika’ reforms, is a typical, old-style Party bureaucrat who, apart from his spell as Ambassador in Canada, served for fifteen years in the Central Committee apparatus in Moscow before the reforms began.

As a Party apparatchik and head of Party propaganda under Brezhnev in the 1960s, Yakovlev published vicious ideological books about the United States with such titles as [see top of page 101]:

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The Call to Slaughter American Falsifiers of the Problems of War and Peace1 [1965];
‘Ideology of the American Empire’ [1967];
‘Pax Americana — the American Ideology’ [1969] and:
‘The USA:  From Great to Sick’ [ 1969].

These books expressed the true views of Yakovlev the apparatchik — not the reformist posture he has subsequently adopted for the purposes of assisting the implementation of the deception strategy.

The Party apparatus, though less visible, will continue to provide guidance to Party members in the reformed institutions.  The Party not only has a vast organisation but also has long experience including periods of illegal operation under the Tsarist regime and in those territories which fell under German occupation in the Second World War.  It will have no difficulty in adjusting to the environment of a fictional ‘multi-Party system’ which in practice it will control.  The Party itself may well be split in two — into reform and orthodox Communist Parties, as is already happening in Hungary.  The ultimate control will stay the same.

What has changed is the system of appointments.  The old, fossilised nomenklatura system has given way to selection for Party and government appointments made in accordance with the requirements of the strategy.  Examples are the appointments of Vadim Medvedev, a former professor of social sciences, as head of ideology; of Falin, former ambassador to Germany and former head of the Novosti news agency, as head of the Central Committee’s Department for International Affairs; and of Dobrynin, former ambassador in Washington, as foreign policy adviser to Gorbachev.  The appointments illustrate the new creative style of the Party apparatus.

All the reforms — the strong Presidency, the new and livelier Congress, the talk of a National Security Council and ‘oversight’ of the KGB, and the creation of a ‘loyal opposition’ — are being carried out with emphasis on their similarity to the American system.  They should all be seen in the context of the strategy of convergence.  This explains the introduction of the pretence of ‘opposition’, the calculated arguments between old-style conformists and ‘Western-style’ members of Congress like Yeltsin on the subject of the KGB and the nationalist and other issues.

It also explains the emergence of groups of Russian nationalists, inheritors of the Slavophile tradition, Stalinists and even anti-Semites represented by ‘Pamyat’ (memory):  all are controlled by the Party and are being used in the interests of the strategy to play on Western hopes and fears.  The Party will continue to exercise its leading strategic role through its members in the Presidency, the government, Congress, the new political groups and the new parties and national fronts.  Even those ‘reform Communists’ who are seemingly calling for a reduction in the Party’s role and the introduction of a ‘multi-Party system’ are in fact fulfilling the instructions of the Party strategists.  This is the essence of the ‘surrender’ of its monopoly by the Party and of the associated ‘reforms’.  It is no accident that these innovations have been worked out by the Party’s ‘think-tank’, the Higher Party School, under its rector, Shostakovskiy, who is also a leader of the Party’s ‘reform group’.  The main contributor to the design of the new Presidency, based on the American and French models, was Vladimir Kudryavtsev, a member of the Congress.

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He was also made Director of the Institute of the State and Law in place of another Soviet legal affairs strategist and former Professor at the KGB Institute, Viktor Chikvadze.  The execution of the strategy of ‘perestroika’ and convergence is not governed by any laws or rules.  It is a skilful application of the Soviet political potential in its absolute totality.  The strategists no doubt realise that they cannot march to victory under Lenin’s banner or even use the word ‘convergence’ while Lenin remains unburied.  They may have toyed with the idea of finally burying him with full honours while in practice they follow his ideas in their final assault on the capitalist West.  But the fact that they have not actually done so implies that to bury him might send the wrong signal to any waverers among the Communists.
36  Editors Note:  ‘In the art of war there are no fixed rules.  These can only be worked out according to circumstances’ — Li Ch’iian, commentator of the Tang period 1618-905] in China, on ‘The Art of War’ by Sun Tzu, cited in the edition Oxford University Press, 1963-71.  The work was translated into Russian by N.I. Konrad in 1950, shortly after the Communist victory in China [‘New Lies for Old’, page 42].

37  Editor’s Note:  COMECON has been re-established as the International Council of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, which held a formal Congress on 20 September 1994 in the huge ‘People’s Palace’ constructed under Ceausescu in Bucharest.  The mastermind behind COMECON’s revival in this new guise is Arkady Volsky, believed to derive his power from his close association with the military-industrial complex.

38  Author’s Note:  Notwithstanding the formal independence of the East European countries, the leverage which continues to be exerted by the provision of oil, gas and electricity via networks established by the ‘former’ USSR, constructed prior to ‘perestroika’, remains as powerful as under the overt Soviet Bloc system.

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